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THE GUATEMALAN FEMICIDE: AN
EPIDEMIC OF IMPUNITY
Natalie Jo Velasco*
EVENTEEN-year-old Andrea Bacaro was found dead in Guate-
mala City on June 12, 2004.1 Andrea had been raped, shot, and
abandoned in a ditch where police found her body with her hands
tied behind her back and her throat slashed.2 She had wounds and cuts
all over her face and chest, her cause of death a close range bullet shot to
the head. 3 When Guatemalan authorities recovered the teenager's body,
they noticed the word "vengeance" had been carved into her right leg.4
On July 27, 2005, Cristina Hernandez, a twenty-year-old university stu-
dent was forced into a grey vehicle outside her home in Guatemala by
four men.5 Neighbors, who witnessed the abduction, immediately alerted
the girl's father.6 Mr. Hernandez went to the San Juan police station,
begged the police to try to stop the kidnapper's vehicle, and pleaded with
authorities to put up road blocks to find his daughter's kidnappers. 7 He
searched the city for hours, returning to the police station in hopes to find
any good news. 8 The police officers claimed they had done nothing be-
cause no report had been filed. 9 They informed Mr. Hernandez that
"many young girls run off with their boyfriends," therefore they couldn't
start a search until Cristina had been missing for at least twenty-four
hours.10
On the morning of July 28, 2005, her body was found dead.1 1 Cristina
had been shot four times, and her body was covered in multiple bite
*Natalie Jo Velasco is a J.D. candidate at Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law, 2008.
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marks.12 All but one of the items of clothing she was wearing were re-
turned to her family and were never used for any type of forensic exami-
nation.13 When the Hernandez family presented her clothes to the
Guatemalan Public Ministry to be of assistance in the investigation, they
were instructed to burn the items of clothing and throw them away.14
The Hernandez family, in fear of their safety, went into hiding soon after
Cristina's murder; and despite the existence of critical leads, including
eye witnesses and potential suspects, Cristina's murderers still remain
free to this day. 15
The cases of seventeen-year-old Andrea Bacaro and twenty-year-old
Cristina Hernandez are tragically common in the impoverished Central
American country of Guatemala. Over the last six years, more than 2,700
women have been raped, mutilated, and brutally murdered in this small
Central American country. 16 Of the estimated 2,781 killed, a mere six-
teen cases made it to trial.17 It is this epidemic of unsolved murders that
is known today as the Guatemalan "femicide, ' '18 and as the death toll
steadily increases, Guatemalan authorities continue to allow those re-
sponsible to escape justice. Officials discount the severity of the femicide;
they fail to conduct proper investigations and allow perpetrators to re-
main at large; and by omission and a system of impunity, the Guatemalan
government is complicit in the terror. 19
Young women ranging primarily between the ages of thirteen and
thirty are the main targets for the murders taking place in and around
Guatemala City, the nation's capital.20 Patterns of violence including sex-
ual assault, physical torture, and mutilation commonly occur before the
women are killed and left in public places.21 Perhaps even more dis-
turbing and commonplace in femicide cases, is the continuous failure of





16. Casa Alianza et al., Summary of Report for Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Execution, Mr. Philip Alston, at 10 (2006) (prepared for use
by Philip Alston, U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary
decisions), http://www.paqg.org/IMG/pdf/Summary-Report-on-Executions_2208
06.pdf [hereinafter Alianza Report].
17. Id.
18. CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, GUATEMALA'S FEMICIDES AND THE
ONGOING STRUGGLE FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS: UPDATE TO CGRS's 2005
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documents/cgrs/cgrs-guatemala femicides2.pdf [hereinafter CGRS UPDATE].
19. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, In-
tegration of the Humans Rights and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Wo-
men, 28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3 (Feb. 10, 2005) (prepared by Yakin




the thousands of victimized women.22 As a result, the pain and suffering
victims and their relatives must endure are compounded by the knowl-
edge that the government's repeated failure to ensure these cases are
thoroughly investigated means Guatemala's predators will remain at
large, and access to truth, undiscovered.2 3 It is Guatemala's system of
impunity that encourages the ongoing femicide as those responsible for
the violent acts are fully aware that they will not be held accountable for
their inhumane actions.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that Gua-
temalan authorities registered the deaths of 1,188 women between 2001
and August 2004.24 Authorities estimate that this number has since esca-
lated to over 2,700 in recent years, including the 229 women and girls
murdered between the months of January 2006 to May 2006.25 But, the
precise number of murders is unknown and remains in dispute for a mul-
titude of factors.26 Fear of reporting the murders by the victim's relatives,
coupled with a lack of public confidence in state institutions, specifically
in the adequacy of how the judicial system responds to complaints, indi-
cates that the figures estimated by Guatemalan authorities are conserva-
tive.27 Officials attempt to dismiss the severity of murders that are
occurring throughout Guatemala by comparing them to similar statistics
for the murder of women in other Latin American countries; however,
the evidence of sexual violence, brutality, mutilation, and torture of vic-
tims in Guatemala, along with the increasing number of gender-based
murders, demands authorities' attention to put an end to the ongoing epi-
demic.2 8 Although Guatemalan authorities have taken some positive
steps to prevent the violence against women, such as "the ratification of
international human right treaties, the introduction of laws and [the] cre-
ation of [new] state institutions ... these measures have frequently not
been effectively implemented, monitored or reviewed and have therefore
seldom prevented women from suffering violence. '29
This article will examine the brutal murdering of women in Guatemala
and will look at the culture of impunity that exists in the country. It will
begin with a brief historical snapshot of the aftermath of the thirty-six-
year civil war and will then delve into the victims and how the femicide
has escalated into what it is today. The article will discuss the current
laws implemented in Guatemala to prevent the ongoing violence and how
22. Amnesty Int'l, Guatemala-No Protection, No Justice: Killings of Women in Gua-
temala, Al Index AMR 34/017/2005 (June 8, 2005, available at http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR34/017/2005 [hereinafter Amnesty Report
2005].
23. Id.
24. Id. (figure was provided to the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women on the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights during her September 2004 visit to
Guatemala).
25. Amnesty Update 2006, supra note 5, at 2.
26. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 3-4.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 6.
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the state has failed to exercise even the slightest diligence in the preven-
tion, investigation, and punishment of these crimes.30 Finally this article
will conclude with a set of suggestions that should be implemented to put
an end to the perpetual violence of women that plagues the country.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
"The roots of the present gender crimes in Guatemala can be traced
back to the civil war that ended in 1996 with a peace agreement between
the Guatemalan government and opposition guerilla groups."'31 From
1960 to 1996, Guatemala suffered an armed conflict that resulted in the
disappearance and death of over 200,000 people and the forcible displace-
ment of over a million Guatemalans. 32
In 1954 after democratically elected president Jacob Arbenz was re-
moved from office, Guatemala experienced a succession of highly repres-
sive dictatorships.33 Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, the United
States contributed "millions of dollars to the Guatemalan right in an ef-
fort to suppress the leftist guerillas, whom the [United States] considered
to be Communist. '34 U.S. President Ronald Reagan feared that if one
Latin American nation became a victim of Communism, then the sur-
rounding nations would inevitably become Communist countries as
well.35 Foreseeing that a 'domino effect' could occur, a substantial
amount of foreign aid was given to the Latin American right.36
The Mayan indigenous people of Guatemala were among those consid-
ered a Communist threat. 37 "[A]fter many joined with the Left to de-
mand greater social equality and equal land distribution," the state
responded with widespread violence.38 83 percent of the estimated
200,000 victims of the civil war were Mayan. 39 400 indigenous villages in
the Guatemalan highlands were annihilated and were subjected to the
widespread, state-sponsored use of barbaric forms of torture. 40 The
Commission for Historical Clarification (Comision para el Es-
clarecimiento Historicos, CEH) blamed security forces for 93 percent of
these crimes. 41 Furthermore, rape was frequently used as a weapon of
30. Id.
31. Kent Paterson, Femicide On the Rise in Latin America, AMERICAS PROGRAM RE-
PORT, at 3, Mar. 8, 2006, http://americas.irc-online.org/pdfreports/0603femicide.
pdf.
32. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 2.







39. Grais-Targow, supra note 33 (referencing the Commission for Historical Clarifica-
tion (CEH) Report, 1999).
40. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 2.
41. Jan-Michael Simon, Scientific Investigator, Max Planck Inst., La Comisi6n para el
Esclarecimiento Hist6rico, Verdad y Justicia en Guatemala, Presentation to the
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war creating an environment where women became more and more vul-
nerable to sexual violence.42 In fact, "sexual assaults were so widespread
in highland combat zones that one local official commented that it would
be difficult to find a Mayan girl of eleven to fifteen who had not been
raped."'4 3 Sadly, many members of the Guatemalan intelligence services,
who were to blame for the countless human rights violations that oc-
curred during the civil war, managed to escape prosecution and to date,
actively participate in police activities and other private security forces.
44
In 1996, after the opposition guerilla groups and the Guatemalan gov-
ernment signed the Peace Accord, 45 the U.S. government and the entire
international community assumed that the country of Guatemala was fi-
nally at peace.46 This premature assumption was far from accurate, how-
ever, because the violence once targeted at the internal Communist
enemy did not disappear, but instead has been displaced on the weakest
sector of society: Guatemalan women. 47 The consequences of the thirty-
six-year "internal armed conflict in terms of destruction of communities,
displacement, increased poverty and social exclusion" all have a bearing
on the levels of violence against women today.48 The brutality of the
murders and the signs of "violence on their mutilated bodies bear many
of the hallmarks of the terrible atrocities committed during the conflict
that went unpunished [in the war] and reveal that extreme forms of sex-
ual violence and discrimination remain prevalent in Guatemalan
society."'49
In addition to the legacy of violence left after the civil war, Guatemala
suffers from a culture that accepts gender and domestic violence. Of the
4,850 reports of domestic violence received by the prosecutor's office in
2003, not a single case reached trial.50 In 2004, 10,000 reports of family
violence were received by the prosecutor's office, yet a mere 370 reached
trial.5 ' The Human Rights Ombudsman and many women's rights orga-
nizations estimate that 90 percent of incidents go unreported, leaving one
to "assume that the actual incidence of domestic violence is exponentially
higher than the number reported. '52 Furthermore, Guatemala's deeply
International Colloquium: Estado de Derecho y Delincuencia de Estado en
Amdrica Latina (Feb. 22-24, 2002) (available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/pub-
lica/librev/rev/boletin/cont/106/art/art6.pdf).
42. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 2.
43. Angelica Chazaro & Jennifer Craig, Getting Away with Murder: Guatemala's Fail-
ure to Protect and Rodi Alvarado's Quest for Safety, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
141, 151 (2006), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/cgrs/cgrs__guate-
malafemicides.pdf [hereinafter Getting Away with Murder].
44. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 2-3.
45. Guatemala Peace Accords, Dec. 29, 1996, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guate-
mala/guat-final_961229.html [hereinafter Peace Accords].
46. Grais-Targow, supra note 33, at 30.
47. Id.
48. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 6.
49. Id.
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rooted culture of patriarchy is also a factor in the ongoing violence
against women. 53 Until the 1998 reforms, the Guatemalan Civil Code
provided that:
The husband had the duty to protect and support his wife, while she
had the right and duty to care for and raise minor children and over-
see domestic tasks[.] Husbands could legally object to their wives
working outside the home[.] Husbands alone could legally represent
the married couple, and they were the sole administrators of the
household's financial resources, as well as any of the family assets[.]
Even when parents had joint custody, fathers were still the sole legal
representatives of their children and the administrators of their
assets[.] 54
Although women's groups were successful in bringing about reform,
many of the assumptions underlying these outdated provisions still hold
true for many Guatemalans.55
II. THE VICTIMS AND THEIR STORIES
Amnesty International reports that "[a]mong the women killed over
the last few years in Guatemala are students, housewives and profession-
als, domestic employees, unskilled workers, members of former member
of street youth gangs and sex workers." 56 Most of the murders have oc-
curred in urban areas of the country, "which have also witnessed a dra-
matic rise in violent crime in recent years often linked to organized crime,
including drugs and arms trafficking and kidnapping for ransom, or to the
activities of street youth gangs known as 'maras'. '57
While the murders may be attributed to different motives and may
have been committed by both state and non-state individuals, a study of
some of the cases shows that the violence is usually gender-based; the
gender of the victim would appear to be a significant factor in the crime,
influencing both the motive and the context, as well as the kind of vio-
lence suffered by the woman and the manner in which the authorities
respond.58
A. THE CASE OF CLAUDINA VELASQUEZ
Nineteen-year-old Claudina Velasquez was studying to become a law-
yer. 59 On Friday, August 12, 2005, Claudina left for class at the Univer-
sity of San Carlos, where she attended her two Friday-morning classes. 60
When Claudina did not make it home that evening her parents began
53. Id. at 151.
54. Id. (discussing the ideals represented in the Civil Code)
55. Id.
56. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Getting Away with Murder, supra note 43, at 150.
60. Id.
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searching hospitals and police stations. 61 On Saturday, August 13,
Claudina's parents were called to identify their daughter's body; she had
been raped, brutally beaten, and died as a result of two bullet wounds to
the head.62 Traces of semen were found on her body.63 Witnesses who
heard the gunfire stated that Claudina had been shot some time in the
early-morning hours of August 13, 2005; however, authorities never de-
clared a time of death.64 Claudina's fingerprints were not taken until
11:30 p.m. that evening, hours after her body had arrived in the morgue. 65
Skin and fluid samples were taken from Claudina's body, even though no
forensic analysis was ever conducted, and her clothing was returned to
her family without undergoing any type of analysis. 66
Witness statements indicated that Claudina had spent the afternoon in
a condo in San Cristobal.67 The building had private security, yet the
Public Ministry never searched or retained the registry of entrances for
the days in question.68 Furthermore, information was received that indi-
cated that, on the evening of August 12, Claudina was seen accompanied
by others in a local supermarket, but the supermarket's surveillance
videos were not searched and the manager on duty was not questioned. 69
Days after Claudina's murder, the primary suspect made a voluntary
statement at the Public Ministry.70 The suspect was not fingerprinted or
taken into custody even though advocates believed there was sufficient
evidence to issue an arrest warrant.71
"Claudina was killed by one thing: impunity... [her] killer knew that
the likelihood of him being found was very remote. 72 The way in which
Claudina's case was handled is a prime example of how the investigative
and prosecutorial processes that are characteristic of the efforts put forth
in femicide cases are failing drastically. 73 Claudina's parents reported
their daughter missing when she failed to arrive at home, but the National
Civil Police (PNC) refused to begin a search until she had been missing
for over twenty-four hours.74 The Public Ministry failed to conduct fo-
rensic analysis on any skin, fluid, or clothing found at the crime scene. 75
This lack of response by authorities evidences a pattern that has repeated











71. Getting Away with Murder, supra note 43, at 150. (referring to the October 2005
Affidavit of Ana Maria Mendez, human rights activist and friend of Claudina
Vasquez).
72. Amnesty Update 2006, supra note 5, at 3.
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and permits those responsible for the brutal murders to enjoy impunity
for their crimes. 76
B. THE CASE OF RODi ALVARADO
Rodi Alvarado was born and raised in Guatemala. 77 Her battle and
escape to the United States demonstrates the failure of her home country
to provide any meaningful protection for women who are victims of do-
mestic violence and femicide. 78 At a mere sixteen years of age, Rodi
married Francisco Osorio, a former soldier five years her senior. 79 Al-
most immediately after they were married, Osorio began to threaten and
violently assault her, and the assaults continued over the course of ten
years.80 Osorio raped and sodomized Rodi on numerous occasions, "in-
fecting her with sexually transmitted diseases, broke windows and mirrors
with her head, dislocated her jaw, and tried to abort her child by kicking
her violently in the spine.' Along with using his hands and his feet
against her, Osorio also resorted to weapons, pistol-whipping her, and
terrorizing her with his machete.8 2
Rodi attempted to flee the family home on numerous occasions, but
Osorio always managed to track her down, beating her unconscious on
one occasion in front of their two children, to punish her for trying to
escape.8 3 He told her that she could never get escape him because he
would find her, "cut off her arms and legs, and ... leave her in a wheel-
chair, if she ever tried to leave."'84 Rodi sought the protection of the au-
thorities, but her attempts were just as futile as her attempts to hide from
her husband. 85 Over the entire course of this decade-long, brutal marital
relationship, neither the police nor the courts of Guatemala intervened
even once.86 The police did not respond when called by a desperate Rodi
on the telephone and never took any steps to arrest Osorio or require
him to appear in response to written complaints filed by Rodi.8 7 When
Rodi finally went before a judge, she was told that he would not "inter-
fere in domestic disputes," and Osorio was saved once again by the cul-
ture of impunity that exits in Guatemala. 88
In 1996, Rodi fled to the United States in a desperate attempt to save
her life and was forced to make a difficult decision to leave her two chil-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id.
79. Getting Away with Murder, supra note 43, at 143.




84. Id. (citing In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (B.I.A. 1999), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vo122/3403.pdf).





dren behind with relatives.89 Rodi sought the help of the San Francisco
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, and in September 1996, a San Fran-
cisco immigration judge granted Rodi asylum. 90 Following the granting
of asylum, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed
the grant to a higher immigration court, the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA), and in June of 1999, the BIA reversed the decision of the
immigration judge by a ten-to-five vote, ordering that Rodi be returned
to Guatemala. 91 In December 2000, Janet Reno "vacated" the BIA's de-
cision in Rodi's case, directing the BIA to re-decide the case once the
regulations were issued in final form. 92
Rodi Alvardo fled to the United States more than a decade ago, yet
her batterer still enjoys the Guatemalan system of impunity, a system that
continues unabated today.93 "A spiked increase in the murders of Guate-
malan women highlights the extent of the state's failure to protect wo-
men," and the ongoing "femicides constitute the clearest manifestation of
the alarming lack of protection from life-threatening violence for Guate-
malan women." 94
III. FLAWS IN PROCEDURES CARRIED OUT BY THE
NATIONAL CIVIL POLICE AND THE
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
Serious deficiencies persist in the organization and functioning of in-
vestigations and prosecutions.95 The failure to carry out even the most
basic investigations and the inability to process and protect crime scene
evidence are indicative of a pattern of negligence by state institutions to-
wards the killing of women. 96 Recently, the Guatemalan government an-
nounced a newly-created National Commission to Address Femicide,
with a mission to develop strategies for the government to address the
crisis that plagues the nation.97 But, even with the government's recent
attempt to address the severity of violence against woman and its creation
of a National Commission, it has devoted scant resources to existing law
enforcement and investigative institutions, and has failed to effectively
address the systemic shortcomings. 98
As a direct result, successful prosecutions are lacking.99 Angela Gon-
zalez, a member of Guatemala's Network to Oppose Violence Against
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Getting Away with Murder, supra note 43, at 145.
92. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999) vacated and remanded (A.G. 2001);
see also A.G. Order No. 2379-2001, (Jan. 19, 2001), available at http://cgrs.uchast-
ings.edu/documents/lega/ag-ra-order.pdf.
93. Getting Away with Murder, supra note 43, at 146.
94. Id.
95. Amnesty Update 2006, supra note 5, at 3.
96. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 15.
97. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 10.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 11.
2008]
406 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
Women noted that only fifteen sentences have been handed down for the
more than 2,000 murders in Guatemala. 1° °
A. INADEQUATE RESOURCES
The heavy case loads, lack of equipment, and the continuing shortage
of police investigators play a predominant role in why most initial investi-
gations are flawed.10 1 In February 2004, Yakin Ertirk, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, visited Guatemala to evaluate
the magnitude of violence against women. 10 2 In her report, the U.N. Spe-
cial Rapporteur noted that "[t]he Women's Office of the Ministerio Pdb-
lico and the special unit of the PNC reported that 40 per cent of the cases
are filed and never investigated," the unit claiming they lack the resources
and personnel to carry out a proper investigation. 10 3 At the time of the
U.N. Special Rapporteur's visit, the special unit designated to investigate
the brutal murders operated with twenty investigators who were subse-
quently divided into five groups.10 4 Each investigator was estimated to
have twenty cases pending. 10 5 Shortly after Yakin Erttirk's visit, a new
Female Homicide Unit (Unidad de Homicidios contra Mujeres), a part of
the Criminal Investigation Service (SIC, Servicio de Investigacion Crimi-
nal) of the PNC was created to investigate the overwhelming number of
murders against women. 10 6 This newly established investigative unit
functions with fifteen officers, each covering twenty-three cases; they
share one car, one cellular phone, and one working computer.10 7 Unit
police officers admit, "we don't have the tools to carry out the work.'
' 0 8
In addition, police investigators lack a laboratory for performing DNA
tests. Instead, blood and semen samples are examined at the University
of San Carlos, where samples are so often received in imperfect condi-
tion, the tests are rendered invalid and useless.' 0 9 This lack of scientific
expertise, coupled with the fact that there is no national registry of miss-
ing people in Guatemala, makes it difficult to cross-reference information
received or identify the tortured and mutilated victims.1 ' 0 The head in-
vestigator of the Female Homicide Unit stated in a press article that it
was extremely difficult to establish "whether the unidentified women had
previously been reported as missing because there was no coordination
with the Missing Persons Unit (Unidad de Desaparecidos)."'
100. Paterson, supra note 31, at 2.
101. Amnesty Update 2006, supra note 5, at 3.
102. Ertuirk Report, supra note 19, at 2.
103. Id. at 16.




108. Amnesty Update 2006, supra note 5, at 3.
109. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 17.
110. Id. at 18.
111. Id.
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B. DELAYED OPENING IN INVESTIGATIONS
Police officials in Guatemala wait a period of forty-eight to seventy-two
hours before beginning a search for a missing person.1 12 This often inad-
equate response directly conflicts with the duty of due diligence to pre-
vent violations of human rights.11 3  Routine delays in opening
investigations have no basis in the law.114 Instead, they are a mere result
of bad practice.11 5 Unfortunately, delaying the opening of an investiga-
tion seriously diminishes the chances of finding the women alive or iden-
tifying those responsible.
On February 1, 2002, Nancy Peralta left her home at six in the morning
to go to work in Guatemala City.116 Nancy failed to return home that
evening, and her family immediately began searching local hospitals and
police stations. 117 When her sister attempted to report Nancy missing,
the police questioned whether the family was sure Nancy had not run off
with her boyfriend and told her that she would have to wait forty-eight
hours to lodge a missing persons' report.' 1 8 Nancy's sister provided au-
thorities with a description of Nancy and left a photograph. 1 9 She called
the morgue and gave her sister's description but was informed no woman
had been admitted, when in fact a death certificate had been issued a few
hours earlier on behalf of an unidentified woman.' 20
The next time her family saw Nancy was two days later at the morgue,
her flesh perforated with 48 stab wounds and covered with bruises. Her
body had been discovered in an empty lot in a slum in the southwest part
of the city, a few miles from San Carlos University-her college and the
place where she had been abducted. 121
An article and photograph were published in the local press reporting
the discovery of a body of an unidentified woman whose throat had been
cut.1 22 Nancy's father called the morgue, provided another description of
Nancy, only to find out it was his daughter's body that lay lifeless in the
morgue. 123 Even though both police officials and the morgue had been
given a description and photograph of Nancy Peralta, no effort was ever
made to cross reference that data with that of the unidentified murder
victims. 124
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id. at 15.
114. Id. at 16.






121. Laura E. Asturias & Virginia del Aguila, Unrelenting Danger, AMNESTY INT'L
MAGAZINE, Fall 2005, at 2, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/Fall-2005/unre-
lenting.danger/page.do?id=1105190&nl=2&n2=19&n3=354.
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Nancy Peralta's story is one that highlights how authorities fail to open
proper investigations of those reported missing.125 In Nancy's case, po-
lice officials chose not to act based on the notion that Nancy Peralta was
missing on her own accord. 126 They never once carried out an assessment
or an investigation of the circumstances in which Nancy went missing, but
instead placed the burden of proving her disappearance was not volun-
tary on the family.' 2 7 It is these very practices that demonstrate how ini-
tial investigations to establish whether a crime has been committed are
often lacking and virtually non-existent.'
28
C. FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE CRIME SCENE AND
COLLECT EVIDENCE
"[T]here is a clamorous absence of physical and scientific proof."'1 29
Fifteen-year-old Maria Franco was left for dead on the ground at ap-
proximately 10:00 p.m. on December 17, 2001.130 A man informed au-
thorities that a dying woman had been found; however, police failed to
arrive at the scene that night, only to turn up the following afternoon to
remove the body.13 ' Maria's mother reported:
They didn't even do a fluid analysis. They gave me all her clothes in
a bag and when I saw some white stains on it, I asked at the morgue:
what's this, is it semen? My little girl had been very badly treated,
there was blood on her front and back and they didn't do any blood
analysis or anything. It's been two years and eight months since she
was murdered. Where are the forensic tests?
132
Numerous reports have reiterated the consistent and blatant failure of
investigators to collect and protect essential evidence from crime
scenes.133 Clothes of victims, often stained with blood, semen, and other
bodily fluids, are routinely returned to families or buried with the victims
without safeguarding key evidence.' 3 4 The possibility of identifying and
prosecuting perpetrators is seriously reduced when samples of specimens
such as seminal fluid, blood, skin, or hair are not preserved and ana-
lyzed.135 The "failure to protect, examine or preserve the crime scene
and deficiencies in collecting evidence and maintaining the chain of cus-




128. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 16.
129. Id. at 17 (quoting the official comment of the IACHR Special Rapporteur on Vio-
lence against Women, September 2004).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Amnesty Int'l, Guatemala: No Protection, No Justice: Killings of Women and Girls
- Facts and Figures, Al Index AMR 34/024/2005, June 9, 2005, available at http://
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133. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 12.
134. Id.
135. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 17.
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greatly restricts the progress of investigations. 136 Furthermore, on many
occasions, investigators are delayed in reaching the crime scene, which
creates an inability to keep the scene free from contamination by local
residents or from the press. 13 7 Official reports often "indicate that the
scene of the crime was tampered with prior to the arrival of the Public
Prosecutor's Office and personnel responsible for processing the crime
scene." 
138
D. LACK OF WILL ON THE PART OF THE INVESTIGATORS
In addition to inadequate resources, the attitudes displayed towards
victims and their surviving family members indicate a lack of will on the
part of the investigators. 139 Investigative authorities persistently place
blame on the victim and are reported to exude hostility towards family
members, both indications that there is a lack of commitment to bring the
murderers to justice. 140 Authorities are quick to look for signs that the
victim is a prostitute, a "nobody," or involved in gang related activities in
order to justify their lack of due diligence in thoroughly investigating the
murders.1 41 In late 2005, Dorothy Ascody, an American concert pianist,
was murdered with a pickax.' 42 Rather than search for the stolen car
linked to the murder, investigators in the Homicide Unit were looking
into possible links between Dorothy and narco-traffickers, despite any
indication that the pianist had ever been linked to criminal activity. 14 3
What is even more disturbing is that the practice of placing blame on the
victim is not limited to individual investigators. In 2004, Guatemalan
President Oscar Berger stated, "We know that in the majority of cases,
the women had links with juvenile gangs and gangs involved with organ-
ized crime," despite possessing no statistical evidence to support his state-
ment. 144  Although in recent statements President Berger has
acknowledged that the ongoing femicides are the product of societal ine-
qualities and discrimination, government officials continue to publicly al-
lege a connection between the victims and organized crime.1 45
Relatives of a number of victims complain that they often have to
prove their relative was "respectable" or that they had not been involved
in any crimes before their complaints are taken seriously. 146 Families are
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Press Release, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Human Rights
Ombudsman Identifies Serious Shortcomings in Investigation of Murdered Wo-
man in Guatemala (Oct. 26, 2006) (on file with WOLA) [hereinafter WOLA Press
Release].
139. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 13.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id.
144. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 21. (quoting President Berger's statement
to La Nacion newspaper on June 26, 2004).
145. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 15.
146. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 21, at 21
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even discouraged from pressing charges, confronted with questions such
as, "if she is already dead, what are you looking for?"'1 47 Threats and
harassment often stain the lives of those relatives who demand justice,
and many are forced to live life in fear or in hiding.148 The protection of
witnesses and surviving families is yet another significant weakness in the
Guatemalan legal system. 149
In addition to the indifferent attitude investigators and officials display,
family members frequently report that authorities have failed to provide
them with information about the progress of the investigation, failed to
pursue potential leads, and have treated victim's relatives dismissively.' 50
Article 116 of the Guatemalan Code of Criminal Procedure allows vic-
tims, relatives, and others to act as joint parties to the state prosecution,
giving them the right to propose different methods of investigation, the
ability to participate in proceedings, request tests and examinations, as
well as seek intervention from a judge, should they disagree with a prose-
cutor's decision. 151 Although Article 116 allows for victims and their rel-
atives to become joint parties, due to the lack of free legal services and
the complex process to become a joint party, those individuals who can-
not afford to seek legal assistance are denied access to justice. 152
I asked if I could have copies of the case file and they said no, that
we had to become a joint party. As we have very little money, we
could not pay for a lawyer. At first they would not even let me see
the case file. It was only when I got angry that they started to show
me things but I have not been able to get a copy ... When we ask for
certificates or copies of legal documents, they charge us ... I am
going to study law because we don't have a lawyer so we aren't ac-
cepted as a joint party ... It is very sad not to have even a lawyer
who can write a legal document. 153
"Even where those affected are not a joint party to the prosecution,
article 81541 of the Public Ministry Law (LOMP, Ley Organica del Minis-
terio Ptiblico) states that it is the responsibility of the prosecutor to pro-
vide information to them," and this information can not be refused.155
Should a prosecutor fail to provide information about the investigation,
they will be subjected to disciplinary action.' 56 In addition, according to
147. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 14.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 20.
151. Id. at 19.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting a statement by Maria Elena Peralta, sister of Nancy Peralta).
154. Decreto No. 40-94, 3 May 1994, Ley Organica del Ministerio Publico, tit. I, art. 8
(Guat.), available at http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/mla/sp/gtm/sp-gtm-mla-leg-
publico.pdf.
155. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 19-20.
156. Id. at 20.
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Article 49157 of the LOMP, parties concerned can propose measures at
any time during the preliminary phase of investigation, and these mea-
sures should be carried out if the prosecutor considers they are useful. 158
Despite the existence of these provisions, officials often do not abide by
them.
Several surviving family members report that authorities fail to provide
relatives with information about the investigation process. Nancy Pe-
ralta's sister, Maria Elena, insisted that the Public Ministry call potential
witnesses and asked for a picture of the witness who called the police the
night Nancy was killed. 159 Maria Elena and her family also asked investi-
gators to inspect the area where Nancy's body was found; over two years
later, the site had yet to be examined.160
Maria Franco, mother of the fifteen-year-old who was left for dead on
the evening of February 2002, reported that her daughter had her mobile
phone with her when her body was found.161 She too asked the Public
Ministry to investigate the calls from that day, yet officials failed to do
s0. 62 After obtaining a list of the calls made, Maria Franco handed the
numbers over to the prosecutor's office, where the numbers were filed
away and have not been investigated. 163 Even though an eye witness
called authorities and informed them of the body of a young woman left
for dead, minutes after he saw her body being dragged from a car, the
Public Ministry did not investigate the house where the car was that
night.164
IV. GUATEMALA'S OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A comprehensive set of commitments on human rights, including rec-
ommendations regarding the fulfillment of the rights of women, are con-
tained in the 1996 Peace Accords. 165 The Guatemalan state pledged to
"combat all forms of discrimination against women, to promote equality
and women's full and effective participation in all areas of public life and
national development.' 66 Additionally, in May 2002, the Guatemalan
government ratified the Optional Protocol to the U.N. Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 167 passed
157. Decreto No. 40-94, 3 May 1994, Ley Organica del Ministerio Publico, tit. III, ch. 1,
art. 49 (Guat.), available at http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/mla/sp/gtm/sp-gtm-
mla-leg-publico.pdf.
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the Law for the Dignity and Integral Promotion of Women 168, the Law to
Prevent, Punish, and Eradicate Violence in the Family, 169 and is under-
taking reforms to the Civil Code removing certain discriminatory provi-
sions.170 Despite efforts to put an end to the violence and discrimination
that taints the country, gaps exist, especially in the legislative sphere, that
make the implementation of legal measures to protect women's rights an
uphill battle.
A. THE EXISTING LAWS
In order to fully understand how femicide has escalated to the level it
has today, it is necessary to take a deeper look into the existing laws in
the impoverished Central American country of Guatemala.
1. Crimes of Sexual Violence
Although article four' 71 of the Guatemalan Constitution guarantees
equal rights for men and women, such equality is not reflected in sections
of the Criminal Code rendering women more vulnerable to violence. 172
In a country tainted with the existence of brutal murders often coupled
with sexual violence, the Criminal Code demonstrates the State's lack of
commitment to prevent violence against women. 173 For example, rape
occurring within marriage is not recognized as a crime, rendering spouses
and live-in partners incapable of being prosecuted for such an act.174 This
provision condemns women to a life where her human rights are con-
stantly violated. Additionally, it wasn't until December 2005 that the
Guatemalan "rape" law, article 200,175 allowing a rapist to escape charges
by marrying his victim was deemed unconstitutional. 176 The action came
not from the Guatemalan Congress, but from the Constitutional Court
after the Human Rights Ombudsman challenged the constitutionality of
the article. Currently pending review, article 200 still applies to cases that
were initiated before December of 2005.177 Furthermore, it is the respon-
sibility of the victim of rape and other sexual crimes to initiate prosecu-
168. DECREE No. 7-99, Ley de Dignificaci6n y Promoci6n Integral de la Mujer, April 9,
1999 (Guat.).
169. DECREE No. 97-96, Ley para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia In-
trafamiliar, Nov. 28, 1996 (Guat.), available at http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/
0145.pdf [hereinafter Law to PSEV].
170. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 14.
171. CONSTITUCION POLITICA REFORMADA POR ACUERDO LEGISLATIVO No. 18-93,
art. 4, Nov. 17, 1993, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Guate/
guate85.html [hereinafter GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION].
172. Getting Away with Murder, supra note 43, at 154.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 171, art. 200.
176. Amnesty Int'l, Mexico and Guatemala: Stop the Killings of Women, at 2, Jan. 2007,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=ENGUSA20070130001.
177. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 22.
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tion of the crime, rather than the Public Ministry itself.178 Article 106179
allows an offender to be released from criminal liability if he is pardoned
by his victim. 180 This type of provision exposes those who are unaware of
their rights in the Guatemalan justice system, or those who simply lack
funds, to be pressured and coerced into not filing complaints or
charges.181 The Guatemalan Criminal Code also provides that it is only a
crime to have sexual relations with a minor if the victim is considered
"honest. ' 182 "This focus on the victim's perceived character and conduct
rather than on the perpetrator's punishment has emerged as an undercur-
rent in the government's investigation and reporting of the femicides.'
83
Articles 89 and 89184 allow women to marry at the age of fourteen and
have not been amended despite repeated urging by the U.N. Committee
of CEDAW.185
2. Domestic Violence
"Despite its nearly epidemic levels, domestic violence is currently not
criminalized.' 186 The 1996 Law to Prevent, Sanction, and Eradicate In-
tra-Family Violence failed to criminalize domestic violence, and despite
its ratification, it has been thinly applied.1 87 Even more disturbing, prose-
cutors have stated that the perpetrators of violence against women in a
family setting can only be charged with assault if signs of physical injury
from the abuse persist for ten days.1 88 One prosecutor explained:
[F]amily violence does not constitute a crime; as a consequence, a
case cannot be initiated unless there are injuries. In that case, it
should be determined how much time will be required for the inju-
ries to heal in order to establish whether or not a case should be
opened. But, when the woman appears and there are no injuries
present, there is nothing that can be done.
189
This approach not only requires that the violence against domestic
partners be so grave that signs of injury persist for at least ten days, but it
also blatantly ignores other forms of violence, such as psychological vio-
lence, and "decreases the possibility for penal or judicial intervention at a
time when it could actually prevent a woman from being murdered." 190
Sadly, thirteen percent of the women who reported domestic violence to
local authorities were later murdered, and the lack of response has con-
178. Id.
179. GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 171, art. 106.
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tributed to their deaths. 191
B. GUATEMALA'S NATIONAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN
The Guatemalan government has taken legal measures to protect wo-
men's rights; however, most of their efforts have proven to be
unsuccessful.
1. Belem do Para
On April 4, 1995, Guatemala ratified the Inter-American Convention
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Wo-
men, commonly known as the Convention of Belem do Para.1 92 Guate-
mala committed to:
[t]ake all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to
amend or repeal existing laws and regulations or to modify legal or
customary practices which sustain the persistence and tolerance of
violence against women; ... establish fair and effective legal proce-
dures for women who have been subjected to violence which include,
among others, protective measures, a timely hearing and effective
access to such procedures; ... establish the necessary legal and ad-
ministrative mechanisms to ensure women subjected to violence
have effective access to restitution, reparations or other just and ef-
fective remedies ... 193
Although Guatemala ratified the Belem do Para, a number of discrimina-
tory legal provisions remain in the statute books that are not in compli-
ance with Guatemala's international obligation to prevent, investigate,
punish, and eradicate violence against women. 194 The temporary suspen-
sion of article 200 that allows rapists to escape culpability by marrying
their victims is a prime example of how domestic law conflicts with the
Convention obligations.
2. Ley para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia Intrafamiliar
Additionally, Guatemala implemented The Law for the Prevention,
Sanction and Eradication of Domestic Violence, a law that specifically
addresses violence against women in accordance with the Belem do Para.
Under this law, the registration of cases, the collections of statistics, and
the development of public policies are required in order to be in compli-
191. Asturias & del Aguila, supra note 121, at 4.
192. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States,
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment And Eradication Of
Violence Against Women "Convention Of Belem Do Para", June 4, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1534, available at http://www.unicri.it/wwd/trafficking/legal-framework/
docs/interamericanconvention of belem-do-para.pdf [hereinafter Belem do
Para].
193. Id. art. 7(e)-(g).
194. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 24.
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ance with the convention. 195 Furthermore, as a direct result of the imple-
mentation of this law, the National Coordinator for the Prevention of
Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women (CONAPREVI) was
created in 2000.196 The CONPREVI, which was officially established in
2001, consists of the president, the president of the judiciary, the head of
the Public Ministry, the president of the National Statistical Institute, a
representative of the Programme for the Prevention of Domestic Vio-
lence and Violence Against Women (PROPREVI), and a representative
of the First Lady's Office of Social Work.197 The primary function of the
CONAPREVI is to implement the law to prevent, punish, and eradicate
domestic violence. Unfortunately, CONAPREVI has not received the
political or financial support needed to fulfill its fundamental task.198
In February of 2004, CONAPREVI launched a progressive national
plan for the prevention and eradication of violence against women known
as PLANOVI. 199 This national plan is based on the notion that State
institutions are responsible for eliminating all forms of violence against
women, domestic included, and in order to effectively address the femi-
cide, action must be taken in a coordinated and comprehensive man-
ner.20 0 PLANOVI consists of four particular areas:
1. Research, analysis, and statistics.
2. Prevention of Domestic Violence (VIF) and Violence against Wo-
men (VCM).
3. Integral assistance to VIF and VCM survivors.
4. State institutional strengthening.2
0 1
The implementation of PLANOVI has been limited throughout Guate-
mala due to low financial resources available; however, the Program for
the Prevention of Violence of the Inter-American Development Bank has
established a special component that will allocate $6.4 million to
CONAPREVI to initiate a successful implementation. 20
2
3. The Special Commission on Femicide
Recently representatives of the three states powers came together to
form the newly created Special Commission on Femicide.20 3 The Com-
mission's primary purpose is to develop a well-coordinated plan, a well-
articulated strategy, and a proposal to address the crisis that plagues the
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nation.20 4 It intends to focus its attention and resources on five working
areas: research, training, lobbying and political influence, operational de-
cisions, and communication and broadcasting. 20 5
Although positive steps have been taken by the Guatemalan Govern-
ment in terms of ratification of treaties and conventions and introducing
new laws to address the continuing violence against women, until the laws
are implemented, and those who are in violation of the laws are prose-
cuted, the brutality against women that persists around the country is des-
tined to continue.
C. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Violence against women is not only a violation of domestic laws, it is a
violation against fundamental human rights that are protected on an in-
ternational level. "International human rights standards place a clear re-
sponsibility on States to take effective measures under the obligations to
prevent, protect and fulfill, to deal with any type of conduct by private
individuals which impedes the full exercise of human rights, including vio-
lence against women in the context of the family or the community. '20 6
Regardless of whether or not these crimes are committed by gang mem-
bers, the average citizen, the battering husband, or even a state official,
those perpetrators committing the crimes are responsible for their acts
under international law. The failure of the state of Guatemala to effec-
tively respond to reports of torture, mutilation, killings, and abductions
means that the Guatemalan state incurs international responsibility under
the obligations it has contracted as a result of ratifying regional and inter-
national standards.20 7
1. Duty to Protect Rights with Due Dilligence
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) both promote the
ideals of the rights to life, physical integrity, and personal safety.20 8 It is
the obligation of the State not only to recognize and respect the standards
enshrined in the international conventions, but each state has an obliga-
tion to protect and ensure those rights when they are threatened by crimi-
nal activity of private individuals. Article 1 of the Organizations of
American States (OAS) ACHR:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights
and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject
to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and free-
doms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 25.
207. Id. at 26.
208. Id.
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economic status, birth, or any other social condition. 20 9
In the Velasquez Rodriguez case in Honduras where the identities of
those responsible were not known, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights emphasized the concept of "due diligence" to describe the degree
of effort a State must make in order to comply with its international obli-
gation to ensure the exercise of human rights.210 The Court held:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a
private person or because the person responsible has not been iden-
tified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not be-
cause of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the
Convention. 211
The Court clarified that acting with "due diligence" means each State
must take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations, that they
must use their available resources to carry out serious, thorough investi-
gations, that they must identify those responsible for the violations, pros-
ecute and impose the appropriate punishment, and ensure the victim or
the victim's family receives adequate reparation.212 Furthermore, if State
authorities allow violations of human rights to go unpunished, resulting in
the victim's full enjoyment of such rights to not be restored, then the
State will have failed to ensure the exercise of the rights provided under
article 1 of the ACHR.213 The Court held that the investigation "must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained
to be ineffective. '214 Reliance cannot be placed on the victim or the vic-
tim's family to initiate the investigation; instead, authorities themselves
must carry out an effective search for the truth.215 The Inter-American
Court stated "[t]his is true regardless of what agent is eventually found
responsible for the violation. Where the acts of private parties that violate
the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a
sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the
international plane. '216 Ultimately the Court concluded that, although a
disappearance could not be directly attributed to State officials, the
State's failure to act with due diligence was in itself a breach of the duty
to ensure the victim of his/her fundamental human rights.217
209. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States,
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.
htm [hereinafter ACHR].
210. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 26.
211. Velasquez Rodriguez, Case No. 7920 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Series C, No. 4, 172,
(1988), available at http://www.javier-leon-diaz.com/enforced-disappearances/Ve-
lasquez%20Rodriguez.pdf.
212. Id. T 174.
213. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 27.
214. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 211, 177.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. $1 185-88.
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The lack of proper investigations in Guatemala, coupled with de
minimis prosecutions of those responsible for the torture, dismember-
ment, and murders of young women, evidence not only the system of
impunity that exists across the country, but also Guatemala's blatant fail-
ure to fulfill its international obligations.218
2. Due Diligence in Fighting Violence Against Women
The idea of due diligence outlined by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in the Honduras case has also been adopted by the inter-
national community with the specific intention of combating violence
against women.2 19 In 1993, the United Nations issued the Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence against Women. 220 Article 4 reads:
States should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a
policy of eliminating violence against women and, to this end,
should ... [e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in ac-
cordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private
persons22 1
U.N. Special Rapporteur Yakin Erttirk put forth a series of criteria as-
sessing whether states had adhered to the due diligence standard by eval-
uating whether or not the right not to be subjected to violence by private
persons was available to women.222 In her report, Erttirk examined
whether constitutional guarantees were provided, how the criminal jus-
tice system functions, whether reparations were obtainable, whether sup-
port services, education, and public awareness programs were available,
and whether statistical data was being collected. The U.N. Special Rap-
porteur ultimately concluded that Guatemala's violence against women is
met with impunity as authorities have failed to investigate cases and pros-
ecute perpetrators. 223 The 2005 report stated that the absence of a rule of
law in Guatemala fosters a continuum of violent acts against women and
that security and justice institutions have not responded adequately to the
crisis at hand.224
Additionally, Guatemala recently ratified the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women. The recent adoption of the Protocol "has created a further
mechanism for combating violence against women by giving women who
have been denied justice in their country the opportunity to seek redress
at an international level for violations of their rights under the Conven-
218. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 17.
219. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 27.
220. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res 48/104,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/en-
glishIlaw/eliminationvaw.htm.
221. Id. art. 4(c) (emphasis added).
222. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 27.
223. Ertiurk Report, supra note 19, at 2.
224. Id.
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tion. ' '225 Victims or their representatives are allowed to submit a claim
directly to the Committee after all other resources and remedies have
been exhausted on a domestic level.226 The Committee can then carry
out in-depth investigations and reach a decision on the case in
question. 227
Finally, the Belem do Para reflects the enormous efforts of the Inter-
American system to develop scientific measures that will protect women's
rights to a life free from violence, whether at home, in the local commu-
nity, or in the custody of State officials. 228 Article 7 provides:
The States Parties condemn all forms of violence against women and
agree to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies
to prevent, punish and eradicate such violence and undertake to...
apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for
violence against women. 229
Furthermore, article 8 of the Convention discusses specific measures to
implement programs that promote awareness and observance of the right
of women to be free from violence, the right of women to have their
human rights respected and protected, the education and training of all
those involved in the administration of justice, police and other law en-
forcement, and the research and the gathering of statistics and other rele-
vant information relating to the causes, consequences, and frequency of
violence against women.230
V. WHAT NOW?
On May 10, 2006, a letter with the signatures of 115 members of the
U.S. House of Representatives was delivered to the U.S. Department of
State.231 The State Department addressed congressional concerns about
the femicide in Guatemala and assured Congress that it was engaged in
the highest levels of the Guatemalan government to help find solutions to
the steadily increasing level of violent murders of Guatemalan women.232
Despite the recent attention and concern that is being sparked in the
United States and by international human rights organizations, the con-
crete measures needed to seriously address the problem have yet to be
undertaken. 233
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT
As the brutal killing of Guatemalan women continues to increase each
year that passes, many suggestions have been made to put an end to the
devastation.
1. Publicly Condemn the Abductions and Murder of Women and
Girls2 3
4
Even though government officials such as President Oscar Berger and
Supreme Court President Beatriz de Leon have made public statements
regarding the need to eliminate the femicides, concrete action must fol-
low.2 35 Guatemalan authorities should make public announcements con-
demning the violence against women and should not make any assertions
that place blame on the victim or dismiss the severity of the crimes by
explaining that they are a result of organized crime and gang violence.236
2. Establish Concrete Guidelines and Procedures for All Steps of
Criminal Investigation into Reports of Violence237
Immediate, coordinated, full, and effective investigations into all cases
of abduction and murder of young women and girls should be carried out,
making sure that the institutions involved-the PNC, Public Ministry, ju-
diciary, and forensic offices-collaborate fully and are provided with the
necessary gender training resources to fulfill their duties. 238 Crime scene
investigations should be preserved and examined immediately in order to
prevent contamination from outside parties and should meet interna-
tional standards. 239
3. Create a Central, Unified Database of Missing Persons240
In the case of Nancy Peralta, the morgue was unable to identify
Nancy's body, even though her family had reported her missing, provided
a photograph, and provided a detailed description.241 An urgent search
mechanism in cases of women reported missing should be created. 242 In
order to help minimize the number of unidentified victims, a comprehen-
sive list of women reported missing should be compiled.243 Additionally,
a missing persons database should be created in order to improve docu-
mentation and the cross-referencing of case data.244
234. Id.
235. Id. at 25.
236. Id.
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238. Amnesty Report 2005, supra note 22, at 29.
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4. Bring Legislation in Line with International Standards on the
Violence Against Women 245
Currently, there are several gender-discriminatory provisions in the
law.246 Legislation proposing the criminalization of sexual harassment
should be approved along with the permanent suspension of article 200 of
the Penal Code, which would disallow rapists to be exonerated of their
crimes by marrying their victims. 247 Additionally, article 106, which al-
lows for the pardoning by the victim in certain crimes, should be re-
formed to be inapplicable in cases of rape, domestic violence, and other
sexual crimes.248 Moreover, the Center for Gender Related Studies rec-
ommends that the adoption of legislation that would specifically address
femicide cases within the Penal Code and increase resources for the pros-
ecution of murders of women.24 9
5. Train the Judiciary, Investigators, and Other Authorities in Matters
Related to Violence Against Women 250
Gender training, technical assistance, material resources, and oversight
should be provided to the PNC, the Public Ministry, and to the judiciary
personnel.2 5 1 Furthermore, the judiciary personnel should be expanded
in order to send a message that perpetrators will be prosecuted for their
violent actions. An intensive, ongoing training for all police investigators,
crime scene investigation officials, and forensic experts should also be
initiated. 252
6. Implement a Zero-Tolerance Policy to End Impunity253
The Guatemalan government should not only publicly condemn the vi-
olence against women, but should state that gender-based violence is un-
acceptable and will not be tolerated.2 5 4 An official who fails to take
immediate action to prevent injury to Guatemalan women believed to be
at immediate risk should be subject to disciplinary action, and any acts of
harassment and intimidation against a victim's relatives, witnesses, or
members of human rights organizations should be thoroughly investi-
gated and the perpetrators brought to justice.2 55
245. CGRS UPDATE, supra note 18, at 26.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
The U.S. government should play an active role in eradicating violence
against women in Guatemala by using its influence as a global leader to
afford real protection for women's human rights and to bring those re-
sponsible to justice.
1. Congressional Resolution
The United States should support and sponsor a congressional resolu-
tion condemning the murder of over 2,700 women in Guatemala. This
resolution should identify the murders as gender-based and publicly con-
demn the ongoing violence against women, expressing sympathy and con-
dolences for the victim's families.256 Congress should encourage the U.S.
Department of State to help Guatemalan authorities resolve crimes by
incorporating effective investigative and preventative efforts into their
daily routines.257 As a global leader and a promoter of peace, it is the
duty of the United States to uphold the ideals of human rights and rescue
a country stained by such tragedy.
2. Congressional Delegation to Investigate the Femicides
The U.S. government should also employ a delegation to investigate
the ongoing femicide. This delegation should consist of members of Con-
gress and representatives of human rights organizations who will en-
courage immediate, coordinated, full, and effective investigations. 258
They should establish a foundation where funds will be allocated to train
local Guatemalan authorities in order to provide them with the resources
necessary to conduct thorough investigations. U.S. policymakers should
also pressure Guatemalan officials to bring legislation and policy in line
with the international standards on violence against women, as well as
make necessary changes in civil and criminal codes to prevent domestic
violence.
Ultimately, the United States' financial assistance to the Guatemalan
criminal justice system over the years has had little impact on improving
Guatemalan authorities' response to femicide and other acts of violence
against women.259 As in Rodi Alvarado's case, if the United States seeks
to prevent opening the floodgates of refugee asylum seekers, as a global
leader it must get to the root of the problem in Guatemala and use its
considerable influence to pressure authorities to finally implement con-
crete reforms in its legislative and criminal justice system in order to pro-
tect the human rights of women.2 60
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258. Id. at 163.




On February 8, 2006 two young women were found stoned to death
outside of Guatemala City; their skulls were destroyed and their killers
remain free. 261 Sadly, this story is hardly any different than the other
2,781 young girls and women murdered since 2001 in the impoverished
country of Guatemala. 262 "Expectations have been raised, again and
again, but results have rarely followed. Insecurity and inequality prevail,
and a history of failed opportunities has created a disenchantment in a
population eager for change. ' '263
While some initiatives have been taken over the past years to address
the femicide crisis, there has been no real impact on the numbers of wo-
men raped, tortured, mutilated, and ultimately killed in Guatemala. 264
Seven years after the onset of the femicide, a range of serious failings and
shortcomings still exists. Investigations into missing-persons reports are
delayed, crime scenes are not preserved and often are contaminated, evi-
dence is rarely collected, and forensic tests are not performed.
While the Guatemalan government has pledged its commitment to
confronting the crisis, it has not devoted the necessary resources to ex-
isting law enforcement and investigative institutions, nor has it been will-
ing to take a closer look at its systematic failure to protect the women of
Guatemala. 265 Instead, authorities place blame on the victim, dismissing
the severity of the ongoing murders.
A failure to prosecute those responsible for the brutal killings sends a
message to perpetrators that they can get away with murder. "There is a
common denominator to all the murders: impunity, '2 66 and as long as the
authorities fail to investigate and imprison the guilty, women will con-
tinue to die because of a country's blatant indifference.
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